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Burglary Insurance Policies - Reasonable Expectations •
Unconscionability • Application of Implied Warranty of Fitness
C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co.,
227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975)
THE IOWA SUPREME COURT handed down a landmark decision in
C & I Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co.', in holding that insurance
policies carry implied warranties that they are fit for their intended use.
The impetus for this decision was a clause in a burglary and robbery policy
which defined "burglary" as:
. . . the felonious abstraction of insured property . . . from within
the premises by a person making felonious entry therein by actual
force and violence, of which force and violence there are visible marks
made by tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals upon, or physical
damage to, the exterior of the premises at the place of such entry ....
The C & J Fertilizer Co. had requested insurance coverage from the
defendant insurance company. During the negotiations that followed, the
defendant's agent had pointed out that there had to be visible evidence of
any burglary, but had not informed the plaintiff that such evidence had to
be located at the exterior of the premises at the place of entry.' The insurance
was purchased after this negotiation between the two parties, but the policy,
with its restrictive definition of burglary, was not delivered until sometime
later.'
Subsequent to this transaction, C & J did suffer a loss by burglary when
equipment and farm chemicals worth almost $10,000 were stolen from
an interior locked room located in its warehouse. The problem was that
although there was evidence of a burglary-there were truck tire tread
marks in the mud leading up to the exterior door of the warehouse, and
the interior door to the room where the chemicals were stored had been
broken into and visibly marked by tools-there were no visible marks on
the exterior door. The outside door had apparently been opened by a
clever manipulation of the locked handle.' The insurance company refused
to cover the loss, and the trial court, relying on the language in the policy,
ruled in favor of the insurance company.
1227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
2 Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
SId.
4 Id. at 172.
5 Id. at 177.
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The trial court's holding followed the mainstream of insurance cases
dealing with similar limitations. 6 Such a provision is rather common and
is inserted for the protection of the insurer." Even though the clause "clearly
favors the insurer over the insured,"' courts in the past have upheld the
limitation on the grounds that insurance companies would be subject to
fraudulent claims without it,' or that they have the right to pick good risks
to insure." ° Even when the courts have been more sympathetic to the claimant,
they have pointed out that the clause is unambiguous," and, therefore, there
is no opportunity to construe language in favor of the insured."
In a 5-4 decision,'3 the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
6Union Indem. Co. v. S. N. Kleier Co., 34 F.2d 738 (3rd Cir. 1929); Leeds, Inc. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 40 F. Supp. 966 (D. Md. 1941); Johnson v. Pacific Indem. Co., 242 Cal App.
2d 878, 52 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1966); Rauworth v. Commercial Ins. Co., 24 Ill. App. 2d 16, 163
N.E.2d 846 (1959); Wakem & McLaughlin v. Royal Indem. Co., 241 Ill. App. 427 (1926);
Offutt v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 251 Md. 262, 247 A.2d 272 (1968); Scanlon v. Western Fire
Ins. Co., 4 Mich. App. 234, 144 N.W.2d 677 (1966); Swanson, Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins.
Corp., 343 Mo. 350, 121 S.W.2d 783 (1938); Lee v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 216 App. Div. 453,
215 N.Y.S. 366 (1926); Flatow v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 618, 289 N.Y.S.2d
279 (1968); Schwartz v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 120 Misc. 323, 199 N.Y.S. 270 (1923); Terminal
News Stands, Inc. v. General Cas. Co., 203 Ore. 54, 278 P.2d 158 (1954); Artress v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 221 Tenn. 636, 429 S.W.2d 430 (1968).
7 Typically there are three different types of clauses by which insurance companies attempt to
achieve this result:
(1) A provision to the effect that the evidence produced by the insured must be "direct,"
"affirmative," or "conclusive";
(2) A stipulation that the mere disappearance of the insured article shall not be deemed
evidence of burglary or theft;
(3) A provision, as in the instant case, that there be "visible marks" or "visible evidence"
of the use of violence.
Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 189 Kan. 459, 464, 370 P.2d 379, 383 (1962).
8 Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 129, 131 (1965).
9 Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 189 Kan. 459, 370 P.2d 379 (1962); Kretschmer's Home
of Appliances v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 410 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1966); United
Sponging Co. v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 97 Misc. 396, 161 N.Y.S. 309, alr'd, 179 App. Div.
884, 165 N.Y.S. 1116 (1916); 10 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 42:129
(2nd ed. 1962).
10 Insurer understandably might be quite willing
• .. to insure the contents of an automobile which could not be entered except by such
force as would mar exterior, but would be unwilling to insure the contents of an
automobile which could be entered with far less effort.
Continental Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 58 Tenn. App. 316, 323, 430 S.W.2d 661, 664 (1968) (handle
of car door had been opened by manipulation, but there were visible marks on glove compart-
ment which had been jimmied open).
11 See cases cited note 6 supra.
12 The general rule is that ambiguous language must be construed against the writer of the
policy, i.e., the insurance company. E.g., Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 189 Kan. 459,
463, 370 P.2d 379, 382 (1962); Knouse v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 163 Kan. 213, 216, 181
P.2d 310, 312 (1947); Julian Foundry Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 4 In. App. 2d 301, 305,
124 N.E.2d 48, 50 (1955). Such a doctrine serves a regulatory purpose and is often used to
alleviate unfair conditions placed on an insured. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance
with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961, 967 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Keeton].
is The dissent disagreed with the majority view of the applicable substantive law, but thought
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holding. Its decision was based on three separate grounds:
(1) Such a construction of the policy terms would go against the
reasonable expectations of a person buying burglary insurance."
(2) The limitation on coverage, which was inserted as a definition of
burglary under the BURGLARY section rather than in the section
under EXCLUSIONS, where it would have been more apparent,
was unconscionable."'
(3) The insurance company breached an implied warranty to deliver
a policy which would be "reasonably fit for its intended puropse,""'
i.e., to provide the bargained-for protection.
The holding on the basis of reasonable expectations was not unforesee-
able as recent cases have used that concept as a standard by which to
measure insurance coverage." The Iowa Court itself recognized the doctrine
in 1973 in an automobile insurance case.' 8 There the court said:
The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored
even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have
negated those expectations.1 "
In C & J Fertilizer the court directly applied that language and found
that the holding of the trial court should have been affirmed primarily because its findings
that the terms of the policy had not been complied with was supported by substantial evidence.
227 N.W.2d at 182. It thought that the plain meaning of the contract words should apply.
id. at 183.
14 Id. at 177. The minority thought that the doctrine of reasonable expectations ought not to
apply in this case because an officer and director of the plaintiff corporation "knew the
disputed provision was in the policies." Id. at 184.
15ld. at 179-81. The minority would not apply the doctrine of unconscionability because "the
great majority of courts" have not found such a provision to be against public policy. Id. at 184.
16 Id. at 177-78. The minority found the theory of implied warranty to be unacceptable because
there is no case authority for it. Id. at 184.
27 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 171-72, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107-08(1966); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 425 P.2d 346 (1967); Allen v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 305, 208 A.2d 638, 644 (1965); Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co.,34 NJ. 475, 482, 170 A.2d 22, 26 (1961); Sands v. Granite Mut. Ins. Co., 331 A.2d 711, 717(Pa. Super. 1974). The principle has undergirded other opinions where the court has purported-
ly based its decision on other grounds. E.g. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160
F.2d 599 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947) (ambiguous language); Mason v.
Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 249 Iowa 1167, 91 N.W.2d 389 (1958) (intolerably restrictivedefinitions in the policy); Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287, 255 A.2d 208 (1969)(representations of agent which contradicted policy language). Keeton suggests that the
standard of reasonable expectations is a better one to apply in cases such as these; when it is
clear on what ground the court is actually basing its decision, results are more predictable.
Keeton, supra note 12, at 967.
Is Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 905-08 (Iowa 1973).
29 1d. at 906, quoting R. KEETON, INSVMNCE LAw-BASic TExT § 6.3 (a), at 351 (1971).
[Vol. 9:3
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that under the circumstances the plaintiff could have reasonably anticipated
that coverage would be denied in the case of an "inside job", and that visual
evidence would be required to indicate that the burglary was indeed an
"outside" job. It was not reasonable to anticipate, however, that the visual
evidence had to be on an exterior rather than an interior door. 0 The court
did no more than apply a previously articulated concept to burglary insurance
policies, where only the literal language of the contract had previously been
taken into account.
Nor was the holding on unconscionability totally unexpected. Even
though courts have not directly applied the doctrine of unconscionability
-which is normally used in connection with the sale of goods 2 1 -to insurance
contracts, it has probably been recognized silently in many cases which were
decided in favor of the insured apparently on the theories of waiver or
estoppel22 or by a "process of pseudo 'interpretation'. "22
The Supreme Court of Kansas approached direct recognition of the
principle of unconscionability in a case which was very similar to C & I
Fertilizer. In that case,24 the policy in question provided that there must be
visible marks of force and violence upon the exterior of a safe for burglary
insurance to be effective. The combination lock on the exterior door was
manipulated so that there were no "visible marks" on it, but the inside door,
which was fastened with a lock, did bear visible marks of violent entry.
The court held that the plaintiff's loss was covered by the policy because,
• . . the assertion of such rule by the insurance carrier, beyond the
reasonable requirements necesssary to prevent fraudulent claims against
it... contravenes the public policy of this state. This becomes apparent
when the statement of the rule in the policy itself, or its assertion by
the insurance carrier, is designed to prevent recovery on an obviously
justifiable claim. 2
In short, it would be unfair to deny coverage when the substantive terms
of the policy had been met.
20 227 N.W.2d at 177.
2
1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(2) provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract,
or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or
it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscion-
able result.
22 This is probably the only way to explain such cases where there was in fact no voluntary
relinquishment of a known right or detrimental reliance on the part of the insured. Keeton,
supra note 12, at 963.
22 6A A. CoRaiN, CONTRACTS § 1376, at 21 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CoRBIN].
24 Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 189 Kan. 459, 370 P.2d 379 (1962).
25 Id. at 470-71, 370 P.2d at 387.
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Once the situation is recognized as basically unfair, it is but a short
step to apply the doctrine of unconscionability directly. Such an application
would fall into the normal stream of cases concerning contract construction.
Courts have often shown suspicion of standard form contracts which contain
several pages of small type and which are designed to favor the drafter."
This is particularly true in cases where there is a disparity of bargaining
power between the parties." Insurance policies fall into this category in that
they are long standardized forms drawn up by powerful commercial units,
namely the insurance companies.2 Typically, the insured bargains for the
coverage limits and the premium amount, but has no say as to the volume
of fine print accompanying his bargain.29 In addition, it is common practice
for the policy to be delivered after the insurance has been purchased, at
which time there is little motivation to study all the many provisions. 0 In
C & J Fertilizer, the court recognized such factors and said that it was
better to point out clearly why it would not enforce the provision in question
than to bury its reasons in a distorted application of traditional rules.3
It was the third basis of recovery-that insurance policies carry an
implied warranty that they are reasonably fit for their intended purposes-
which was innovative and perhaps controversial. 2 That holding totally
ignored prevailing insurance case law and instead looked to Section 2-315
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 3" That section was drafted to cover sales
of goods"4 and has no direct application to insurance contracts. The Iowa
Court evaded the problem by saying that it did not need a statute to imply
a warranty, 2 but that the standard of the U.C.C. was valuable in that
26 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (one vol. ed. 1952).
27 Keeton, supra note 12, at 963.
28 CoRBN, supra note 23.
29 Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HAv. L. REv. 529, 545 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Slawson].
30 Keeton, supra note 12, at 968.
3' 227 N.W.2d at 181.
92 It should be noted that while five justices concurred in the holdings on reasonable expecta-
tions and unconscionability, only three agreed that implied warranties should be applied to
insurance policies.
33 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment
to select or furnish suitable goods, there is ... an implied warranty that the goods shall
be fit for such purpose.
34 The U.C.C. defines "goods" at § 2-105 as meaning,
. . . all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be
paid, investment securities . . . and things in action. 'Goods' also includes the unborn
young of animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty ....
35 227 N.W.2d at 178. Since implied warranties were originally created by the common law, a
[Vol. 9:3
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"[t]he typical applicant buys 'protection' much as he buys groceries, '"" and
should not be deprived of "those remedies long available to purchasers
of goods."37
Ordinarily a court does not apply policies reflected by statutory law.
Statutes have been narrowly construed and confined to their special areas,"
in spite of the fact that eminent legal writers have urged that statutory law
be elevated to a status fully equal to that of case law and be used as a
model from which to analogize in appropriate situations." This has occurred
in the case of the U.C.C. ° Thus, although the Iowa decision is unique
insofar as it pertains to insurance law, the extension of the policies of the
implied warranty sections of the U.C.C. to transactions other than those
involving the sale of goods is not."1
Courts have implied warranties in cases of bailments for hire, 2 the
sale of new houses,"3 the leasing of real property," goods supplied in connec-
tion with the rendition of a service, "5 and occasionally even contracts for
court does not need the authority of a statute to create them in other contexts. It may choose,
however, to use the principles of statutorily created implied warranties, such as those in the
U.C.C., for guidance. Miller, A "Sale of Goods" as a Pre-requisite for Warranty Protection,
24 Bus. LAw. 847, 853 (1969).
36 227 N.W.2d at 178, quoting 7 S. WILLISTON, A. TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900,
at 34 (3d ed. 1963).
37 Id.
38 Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 385 (1908).
39 Id.; Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 13 (1936).
40 Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
39 FORD. L. REv. 447 (1971).
41 The drafters of the U.C.C. encouraged this result. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313,
Comment 2, reads:
• . . the warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb those
lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined
either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other
appropriate circumstances . . . . [T]he matter is left to the case law with the intention
that the policies of this Act may offer useful guidance in dealing with further cases as
they arise.
42 W. E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970), aff'g 277
So. 2d 528 (Fla. App. 1969); Cintrone v. Hertz Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965).
43 E.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Shipper v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). Contra, Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218
N.E.2d 594 (1966).
4 "Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470, rehearing denied, 51 Hawaii
478, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
45 Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257
(1961) (pipes installed by plumbing contractor); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal.
App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960) (polio vaccine injected by doctor); Warrell v. Barnes,
87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971) (gas pipes supplied in course of installing household
appliances); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (permanent wave
Winter, 1976] RECENT CASES
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss3/5
AKRON LAW REVIEW
service." This has been accomplished either by calling the transaction in
question a "sale", and then directly applying the U.C.C., or by saying that
it is so analogous to a sale that the imposition of an implied warranty is
justified. 7
The Iowa Supreme Court thought that insurance coverage could be
analogized to a sale. An insurance company issues standardized policies so
that it can predict its risks." Losses are reflected in premium rates. This
is not so different from the modem manufacturer who mass produces
standardized goods and is thereby enabled to "calculate the percentage which
the risk of loss bears to each unit and . . [to] reflect it in the sale price of
the goods." 9 Both groups make a profit from the sale of their products, and
the Iowa court thought it particularly noteworthy that both depend on
advertising in order to promote their "wares".5"
However, it is not enough to point out that the two types of transactions
have similar characteristics. It is also important to examine the reasons
behind the extension of the implied warranty concept and determine whether
or not they are present in the transaction at issue."
Generally, implied warranties arise when "social policy requires that
dealings be invested with minimum standards of responsibility." 2 The factors
most often considered are the following:
(1) whether the public interest is affected;
(2) whether the seller is better able than the buyer to determine the
quality of the product;
(3) whether the buyer normally relies on the seller's judgment and
reputation; and,
lotion supplied by beautician); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867(1970) (blood transfused by hospital). Contra, Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 NJ. Super. 228, 227
A.2d 539 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968)(hypodermic needle used by dentist); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Mem. Blood Bank,
Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965) (blood provided by blood bank).
46 Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (mechanical and
administrative services provided by hospital subject to strict liability); Broyles v. Brown Eng'r
Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963) (plans and specifications drawn up by civil engineers);
Jeffreys v. Hickman, 132 Ill. App. 2d 272, 269 N.E.2d 110 (1971) (painting automobile);
Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316
(1972) (electricity supplied by power company).
47 Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653,
667 (1957).
48 Slawson, supra note 29, at 552.
49 Note, Extension of Warranty Concepts to Service-Sales Contracts, 31 IND. L. J. 367, 369
n. 14 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Extension of Warranty Concepts].
50 227 N.W.2d at 177.
51 Extension of Warranty Concepts, supra note 49, at 376-77.
52 Id. at 369.
(Vol. 9:3
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(4) whether the seller is better able to bear the loss and to distribute
the risk of loss over all his customers.53
These underlying policy considerations are all present in an insurance
transaction. The insured agrees to pay his premium in order to be protected
against an unexpected, but potentially devastating, loss." The public is
affected in that society will have to bear the burden if the insured is not
protected.55 It is the insurance company which drafts the contract, and it is
well aware of the quality of the coverage it is offering. The buyer, even if
he were to wade through the pages of small type, is usually unaware of the
statistical frequency of various occurrences. In C & J Fertilizer, the court
deemed particularly important the facts that the buyer must almost totally
rely on the insurance company to sell him the coverage he needs, and that
he does not even know what he is getting until after the transaction is
completed.5" In addition, the insurance company can bear any loss more
easily than can the individual purchaser; in fact, that is precisely the reason
it is in business. 7
Given that the purchase of insurance is not unlike the purchase of
goods, and that the policy considerations for implying a warranty are met,
the C & J Fertilizer holding can be regarded as a natural development of the
case law which has extended the U.C.C. warranties to non-sale situations.
Viewed in this light, the holding is not startling. What is unusual is that the
court did choose to apply this body of law to an insurance case rather than
to look to traditional precedent in the area of insurance law.
It should be noted that the Iowa court made its holding on implied
warranties in a case where it would have been obviously unfair to deny
coverage to the insured. If implied warranties on insurance policies are
limited to like situations, there will not be much effect on insurance law.
These kinds of cases can already be resolved on other grounds, as, for
example, by application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.58
If, on the other hand, implied warranties come to be applied to insurance
53 Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict
Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. RV. 661, 688.
54 1 RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 1, at 2 (5th ed. 1952).
55 Insurance is "vitally affected with the public interest." Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co.,
189 Kan. 459, 470, 370 P.2d 379, 387 (1962). "Insurance carriers . . . are in a better position
to more equitably divide the risk of personal tragedy, insofar as such tragedy can be expressed
in dollars and cents." Sands v. Granite Mut. Ins. Co., 331 A.2d 711, 717 (Pa. Super. 1974).
56 227 N.W.2d at 178-79.
57 1 RiCHARDs ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 1, at 3 (5th ed. 1952).
58 See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
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cases in general, the effect could be far-reaching. Although the court did
not prescribe the coverage that an insurance company must offer,5" it did
require that the policy which the insurance company later delivered "be
reasonably fit for its intended purpose"." The written terms must not be
unreasonable or unfair, and they must provide the protection that the insured
bargained for when he purchased the insurance."'
The court insisted upon full disclosure of any limitations on coverage."
Disclosure was seen as beneficial in that "technical policy provisions which
tend to drain away bargained-for protection" 3 would be eliminated. And if
a purchaser deliberately elected limited protection for a lower premium, at
least he would be fully aware of what coverage he was receiving.6 '
In a society which has become increasingly complex, we have felt a
need for Truth in Lending, Truth in Advertising, and labels that clearly
identify the components of our food and clothing. If the C & J Fertilizer
holding is followed, we will have Truth in Insurance as well.
JANICE Gui
TORTS
Automobile Guest Statute • Unconstitutional • Equal Protection
- Due Process .Right to Seek Legal Redress
Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975)
N JULY 1975, the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Primes v. Tyler'
joined a small but growing number of states' which have declared automo-
bile guest statutes' unconstitutional. The circumstances of the Primes case are
similar to those encountered in countless other suits brought by injured
59 Such a requirement, which would set forth general standards, would be more akin to the
warranty of merchantability under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2) (c).
60 227 N.W.2d at 177. Probably the warranty of fitness for particular purpose was selected
because the insurance purchaser relies on the agent to provide a policy which corresponds to
the needs which the purchaser has communicated. See UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE § 2-315,
Comments I & 2.
61 227 N.W.2d at 178.
62 Id. at 179.
63 Id.
64 Id.
1 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
2 Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); Thompson v.
Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1974);
Johnson v. Hassett 217 N.W.2d 771 (N. D. 1974).
a Ohio's statute is typical of those of states which have guest statutes. OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 4515.02 (Page 1973). Guest statutes have frequently been criticized for the harsh conse-
[V€ol. 9:3
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